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Libya: Will the Revolution Outlast Qadhafi?

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A Research Paper

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Libya: Will the Revolution Outlast Qadhafi?

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A Research Paper

This paper was prepared by [] Office of
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**Libya: Will the Revolution
Outlast Qadhafi?**

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Summary

*Information available
as of 18 May 1988
was used in this report.*

Libyan leader Mu'ammar Qadhafi has failed to institutionalize his revolution after more than 18 years in power. His regime remains a military dictatorship with all power centered in his person. In the civil sector, Qadhafi's experiments in mobilizing public support have not succeeded, and institutions set up to express the popular will are closely controlled by the revolutionary committees that answer only to Qadhafi. On the military side, Qadhafi can no longer count on the support of the regular Armed Forces—the institution with which he seized power in 1969—and has circumscribed its power with the security battalions, several heavily armed praetorian units staffed and commanded by relatives and members of loyal tribes.

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Qadhafi's revolution has largely run its course, and he must rely on coercion to perpetuate his revolutionary vision. Just as Libya in 1969 was ripe for a change to a more nationalistic and activist regime, we believe it now is ripe for a return to normality. Most of the likely successors to Qadhafi probably would adopt more pragmatic policies, resembling those of Algeria or, if the radicals retain some influence with a successor, perhaps those of Syria. Even Qadhafi, for the time being, has found it expedient to back away from some of his more radical policies. Libya almost certainly will not return to the openly pro-Western orientation of the monarchy that Qadhafi overthrew in 1969. Nonetheless, only a regime dominated by the revolutionary committees—the least likely outcome of several alternatives—would continue promoting Qadhafi's radicalism at home and abroad.

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Four institutions central to Qadhafi's regime will play a key role in a Libyan succession: the tribally based security battalions; the regular Armed Forces; the Military Intelligence service; and the revolutionary committees. The security battalions appear to have the greatest institutional strength and are in the best position to seize power after Qadhafi. The other three organizations have serious institutional weaknesses. The revolutionary committees almost certainly will lose their authority once Qadhafi is no longer in power.

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A key factor in a struggle to succeed Qadhafi will be the extent to which the leaders of the powerful security battalions can subordinate their personal ambitions to maintain the political and organizational cohesion of the battalions.

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[redacted] our analysis of likely outcomes of a Libyan succession rests on the assumption that the security battalions will preserve their solidarity. [redacted]

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The most likely Libyan succession scenario is a reasonably smooth transition of power from Qadhafi to a collegial rule dominated by leaders of the security battalions. Although there would be competition for power and jockeying for political position in this transition, it would not be likely to lead to open conflict. Eventually a leader would emerge from the security battalions. Such a regime probably would be ruthless toward domestic opponents. We believe it would abandon Qadhafi's revolutionary agenda—although not necessarily his rhetoric—in favor of more pragmatic policies. It almost certainly would continue a hardline policy toward Israel, including political support for radical Palestinians. [redacted]

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If the security battalions failed to maintain their cohesion, other scenarios would be possible. Even then, we judge the likely outcome of a Libyan succession to be a pragmatic regime dominated by a coalition of factions from the security battalions, the Armed Forces, and Military Intelligence. The revolutionary committees would have to outmaneuver or overcome by force these more heavily armed rivals to have a chance at succession. [redacted]

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All potential successor regimes, except one dominated by the revolutionary committees, almost certainly would desire a more constructive relationship with the United States and the West. Libyan successors probably would turn first to Western Europe for better economic relations and some arms. They also would be likely to seek greater US participation in the Libyan economy. [redacted]

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Qadhafi's absence from the scene will not lead to a sudden reduction of Soviet influence in Libya. The Libyan military's extensive inventory of Soviet-origin equipment will perpetuate its dependence on Soviet support. At the same time, we do not believe Soviet assets in Libya are sufficient to permit Moscow to install a pro-Soviet Marxist regime. Post-Qadhafi Libya probably will follow a nonaligned policy equidistant from both super-powers. [redacted]

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Scope Note

This Research Paper explores the impact of Qadhafi's policies on Libya and the extent to which Qadhafi's radicalism will survive his passing. In particular this paper seeks to answer the following questions:

- What is the nature of the Libyan regime, and what is Qadhafi's place in it?
- What are the key institutions of power in Libya, what are their strengths and weaknesses, and to what extent are their people committed to Qadhafi's ideology?
- How might these institutions behave and interact in Qadhafi's absence, and how will this behavior shape Libyan government and policy?

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The analysis involves a description of the behavior of the regime institutions as a system. Alternative scenarios are examined to determine conditions in which a more radical or less stable regime might emerge. The paper does not try to predict the likelihood or means of Qadhafi's ouster. Instead it seeks to establish the parameters of a Libyan succession struggle and identify the key factors affecting its outcome.

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Libya: Will the Revolution Outlast Qadhafi?

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Since seizing power in a military coup on 1 September 1969, Col. Mu'ammar Qadhafi has confronted a dilemma: he desires and needs to mobilize mass support for his regime, but his commitment to, and promotion of, a revolutionary ideology evokes more resistance than support among the Libyan people. The Libyan political system—the Jamahiriya or “state of the masses”—is largely a product of Qadhafi’s efforts to encourage mass participation in the government and his creation of additional control mechanisms to ensure that the people do not become so involved as to threaten his ideological agenda. Nonetheless, the Jamahiriya remains essentially a military regime, increasingly coercive, with power centered in the hands of Qadhafi and a small number of associates with tribal or personal ties to the Libyan leader.

The Libyan regime is rooted in Qadhafi’s control of military force, but the nature of that control has changed significantly over the last 18 years. At first Qadhafi’s authority derived from his support in the Army, particularly the “Free Officers’ Union,” which, under his leadership, overthrew the Sanussi monarchy of King Idris. As the “vanguard of the people,” the Armed Forces enjoyed a privileged position in Libya and the Free Officers ruled through the 12-man Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), with Qadhafi first among equals. As Qadhafi’s policies became increasingly focused on revolution—at home and abroad—and as his own political dominance increased, his support in the Army began to wane.

The watershed occurred in 1975 when members of the RCC attempted a coup against Qadhafi and failed. The Army was purged and the RCC was reduced to five members—and eventually atrophied—as Qadhafi centralized control of the regime in his hands. Since then Qadhafi has become increasingly reliant on fellow tribesmen and groups of ideological loyalists—the security battalions and the revolutionary committees—to neutralize the threat of a restive military.

The development of the Libyan civil administration since 1969 has been no less tumultuous, with Qadhafi pouring old wine into a succession of new bottles. Employing at various times a mass party on the Nasirist model, a “Cultural Revolution” vaguely inspired by Maoist China, and most recently the nationwide committee system of the Jamahiriya, Qadhafi has tried to generate mass support for his ideology and regime. For the most part, Qadhafi has been frustrated by his impatience with formal institutions and procedures and by the resistance of Libyan social and political customs to his efforts to promote revolutionary change. As a consequence, Qadhafi has used the revolutionary committees in the civil sector to suppress opposition, while he hopes that indoctrination and time will erode passive resistance to his revolution.

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Qadhafi: Flywheel of the Regime

Open reporting indicates that all lines of authority run to Qadhafi. the Secretary of the General People’s Committee—roughly equivalent to a prime minister—and the regional civilian governors have no authority to make decisions. Almost all questions must be referred to Qadhafi. decisionmaking in the revolutionary committees is similarly centralized and that in the Armed Forces orders to issue ammunition or move troops after dark must have the approval of the most senior regime officials.

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Access to Qadhafi is the surest avenue to influence and authority in Libya. Qadhafi has formed a circle of advisers and lieutenants with tribal and personal ties to him. All compete for direct access and then exploit their closeness to Qadhafi to attract supporters, dispense favors, and strengthen their political prestige within the system. For example, private citizens informally seek out senior revolutionary committee officials known to

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Committees Everywhere

Qadhafi, with characteristic lack of humility, presents Libya—officially the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya—as a revolutionary political system that represents the “solution to the problem of democracy.” The “problem of democracy,” according to Qadhafi, is that no person can accurately represent the feelings, needs, and aspirations of another. Western representative democracy to Qadhafi is therefore a sham, since elected representatives cannot truly represent the will of the people. Qadhafi frequently portrays parliamentary systems as not simply misguided or naive, but as malicious usurpations of power by the ruling elites—no doubt a reflection of his narrow experience with such parliaments as they existed under the Libyan monarchy.

Qadhafi's “solution” is to form a countrywide system of committees to express and implement the will of the masses. As the system stands now, the lowest level consists of basic people's congresses—over 2,000 of them. The basic people's congress is something of a hybrid of a New England town meeting and a bedouin tribal gathering. Organized both geographically and functionally (for example, at the workplace), the basic people's congress has several functions. Its most important function is to convey the views of its members to the national level. It also selects people to serve on local people's committees—the executive arm of the government—and oversees their performance. It is both the right and the duty of all Libyan citizens—male and female—to participate in the basic people's congresses to which they belong.

The basic people's congresses meet about three times a year, but the meetings that take place around January are the most important. At these meetings the congresses consider the full range of Libyan policy, from local issues to foreign policy. Once a

consensus is reached, the secretariat of the basic congress—ostensibly an elected officer who chairs the congress—attends a regional congress, usually at the municipality level. Lest the members of the regional congress fall into the sin of representation, they are officially little more than couriers presenting the resolutions of their basic congress. Little policymaking occurs at the regional congress, but the resolutions of the basic congresses under its purview are coordinated for passage to the General People's Congress.

The General People's Congress is ostensibly the highest policymaking body in Libya. It ordinarily meets once a year, about March, to consider the resolutions of the lower congresses, coordinate them, and produce a finished set of resolutions that supposedly set the policy agenda of Libya for the coming year. In addition, the General People's Congress also selects the members of the General People's Committee, that is, the Libyan cabinet. The Secretary of the General People's Congress is in theory head of state, and the Secretary of the General People's Committee is roughly analogous to a prime minister. Neither in fact carries much authority.

The irony of Qadhafi's unwieldy system is that initially it actually worked, at least as far as expressing the “people's will.” In the first few months following Qadhafi's declaration of the Jamahiriya in 1977, many basic people's congresses were turned into forums to promote regional or tribal interests, or even to condemn Qadhafi and his Green Book. By late 1977 Qadhafi determined that “reactionary” elements had subverted the congresses, preventing them from expressing the will of the masses. He responded by forming the revolutionary committees from supporters handpicked and vetted by the

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security services, to prevent the congresses from deviating from the revolution. They have since controlled the congress proceedings and set the agenda of the meetings. [redacted]

Nonetheless, the congresses have occasionally defied Qadhafi and the revolutionary committees: in 1984 the General People's Congress rejected resolutions backed by Qadhafi that called for drafting women into the military. Qadhafi publicly bowed to the will of the congress, but within a few weeks revolutionary committees orchestrated demonstrations by women demanding military service. Qadhafi used this "proof" that the masses desired women to serve in the military and implemented the proposal in spite of the congress. The following year Qadhafi dissolved several basic people's congresses and called for new elections when he discovered that committee appointments were being made on the basis of tribal affiliation. [redacted]

Although this pyramidal system of committees is Qadhafi's brainchild, it has little real power, except possibly in uncontroversial local matters. The committees wield few instruments of coercion beyond local police forces—and even these answer to Humaydi via the Joint Security Operations Room, [redacted]. We do not expect the people's congresses or people's committees at either the basic or national level to play a major role in a succession struggle, although they could be used to provide a patina of legitimacy to a successor. In fact, Qadhafi's successor probably will keep this idiosyncratic system in place, perhaps under a new title, as a convenient means of handling local issues and providing the illusion of popular rule in Libya. [redacted]




Figure 1. Qadhafi has maintained his position by balancing competing factions against each other. [redacted]

have close links to Qadhafi to redress complaints. [redacted] 25X1
[redacted] in 1987 field-grade 25X1
military officers gravitated toward senior officials close to Qadhafi, such as 'Abd al-Salam Jallud and Khalifa Hunaysh, in the hope of obtaining favors and identifying with a powerful sponsor. [redacted] 25X1 25X1

Qadhafi exploits and encourages this competition for influence to strengthen his position and regulate the system. He stands above the competition as final arbiter, which allows him to dispense authority to various factions as he deems prudent. [redacted] 25X1 25X1

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Figure 2. Muhammad Majdhub, Revolutionary Committee Bureau Operations Room chief. Because of his ties to Qadhafi, Majdhub often has more influence than his nominal chief, Major Jallud.



Figure 3. Khuwaylidi al-Humaydi, chief of Military Intelligence, wields considerable power in internal security.

Qadhafi's personalistic style, as well as his ideological contempt of formal government institutions, has led to organizational chaos in Libya. Qadhafi holds no official position within the government. Holders of formal positions of power often wield less influence in the regime, and in their own offices, than do official subordinates who have better tribal or personal ties to Qadhafi or other senior regime officials. Examples include:

- **The Revolutionary Committees Bureau (RCB).**

although 'Abd al-Salam Jallud is titular head of the Revolutionary Committees Bureau, real authority in that institution rests with his subordinates Muhammad Majdhub and Ali Kilani, both fellow tribesmen of Qadhafi with a direct line to the Libyan leader.

- **The Jamahiriya Guards.** On paper,

this key praetorian unit was commanded in 1985 by Col. Muhammad Muqassabi, who in turn reported to Armed Forces Commander in Chief Abu Bakr Yunis Jabir. In reality, the Guards were and are commanded by the deputy commander, Khalifa Hunaysh, who answers only to Qadhafi.

- **The Anti-Imperialism Center.** Although Anti-Imperialism Center chief Musa Kusa clearly is the most powerful man in this organization, his deputy, Mukhtar Qannas, also has ties to Qadhafi and has in the past ignored Kusa's directives.

- **The External Security Organization.**

'Abd al-Salam Zadma—who enjoys Qadhafi's patronage—has used his greater access to Qadhafi to undermine the position of his nominal superior, External Security chief Ibrahim Bishari.

Key Institutions

The organization of the Libyan regime reflects Qadhafi's penchant for personalistic rule and his idiosyncratic political theories. Qadhafi acts as if Libya were "just born" and creates ad hoc structures to meet specific needs. He then draws on loyal tribes or trusted individuals to staff these ad hoc organizations and perform specific tasks. This practice compounds the confused lines of authority because a regime official may wear several "hats"—some official and some unofficial but no less powerful. Military Intelligence chief Khuwaylidi al-Humaydi, for example, focuses primarily on internal security matters, but he is also a key interlocutor with the Tunisian Government, apparently because Qadhafi believes the Tripolitanian-born Humaydi, who has family and tribal links to Tunisia, has a special rapport with the Tunisians.

Despite Qadhafi's aversion to formal institutions, he still requires structures to enforce his policies and preserve his power. The General People's Committee for the most part mirrors the functions of more

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conventional cabinet offices found in most countries. The pyramidal system of people's congresses, which ostensibly conveys the will of the people to the government, is a rough analogue of legislatures elsewhere. In our judgment, however, these institutions are essentially ciphers for policies decided on by Qadhafi and his key advisers. On the basis of the behavior of various government organizations, as well as the differing access of their leadership to Qadhafi, we believe the instruments of control are the vital parts of the regime. []

The Revolutionary Committees. It is perhaps characteristic of Qadhafi that the revolutionary committees—the organization most imbued with Qadhafi's radical ideology and one of the most powerful institutions in Libya—are officially considered separate from the Libyan state. Formed in 1977 for the purpose of “inciting the masses to exercise their authority,” the revolutionary committees fulfill the role of a sole political party trying to mobilize political support for the regime. []

[] the committees' functions have expanded to include serving as a popular militia, an intelligence service, and a force of repression. []

In practice, the revolutionary committees' mission of “inciting the masses” means enforcing loyalty to Qadhafi and his ideology. []

[] the committees primarily collect information on their fellow citizens' political attitudes and forward it to the RCB headquarters in Tripoli. In addition, the committees oversee indoctrination of the public, control the agenda and elections of the basic people's congresses, and, in times of crisis, may be armed to control the population. []

The revolutionary committees play a key role in enforcing political loyalty in the Armed Forces. []

[] the committees have upset the normal military command structure. They may overrule senior officers, and they can prevent off-duty officers from entering military bases. They must approve military personnel actions such as transfers and promotions. []




Figure 4. Revolutionary committees leading a demonstration. Agitation is a principal committee function. []

[] the revolutionary committees play a key role in controlling access to ammunition stocks. Movements of military units must have prior approval from the committees []

The authority of the revolutionary committees is ad hoc rather than derivative, []

[] Public statements by Qadhafi that the committees do not derive their authority from law but from “revolutionary legitimacy” support this. As a result, the revolutionary committees have as much or as little power as Qadhafi wants them to have at any given time. At present the committees wield considerable authority by virtue of Qadhafi's continued confidence in them:

- [] the RCB Operations Room—the revolutionary committees' national headquarters element—draws directly on the Libyan treasury to finance its operations, without reference to a formal budget process. These funds are supplemented by monies confiscated from wealthy Libyans and placed in accounts controlled by individual leaders of the Operations Room.

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The Revolutionary Committees

The revolutionary committees numbered between 14,000 and 17,000 members in 1984, []

[] Despite occasional purges, we believe they remain about that size today.^a The revolutionary committees are controlled nationally by the Revolutionary Committees Bureau (RCB), headquartered in Qadhafi's command compound at Aziziyah Barracks in Tripoli and nominally headed by Qadhafi's principal deputy, 'Abd al-Salam Jallud. The RCB, [] is divided into several functional sections, each of which handles the revolutionary committees organized in specific sectors of government and society, such as the Armed Forces, schools and universities, commercial and industrial concerns, and the government-controlled press. []

[] the committees penetrate all important political institutions and "influence virtually everything" in Libya. []

The most important section in the RCB, [] is the Operations Room, headed by Muhammad Majdhub and Ali Kilani. From the Operations Room, Kilani and Majdhub direct both the overseas operations of the RCB and the activities of revolutionary committees organized on a geographic basis nationwide, []

[] several additional committee echelons exist beneath the RCB.

^a Academic sources estimate total revolutionary committees membership at 3,000 to 4,000, but the extent of the committees' responsibilities suggest the larger number is more accurate. Revolutionary committees are present in over 2,000 basic people's congresses, as well as over 70 military bases and facilities, all government offices, secondary schools and universities, and all but the smallest of commercial and industrial concerns—too great a job for 3,000 to 4,000 people. []

There are revolutionary committees for each of the 13 municipalities, Libya's primary regional jurisdiction. Within the municipalities are committees for each district and, in the larger cities, a smaller committee for each neighborhood of about 6 to 10 blocks. In the Armed Forces, committees are [] located in each garrison, almost certainly down to the level of individual battalions. [] there are revolutionary committees for each faculty at the universities in Tripoli and Benghazi, as well as for individual factories and government offices. []

Despite this sizable bureaucracy, [] the revolutionary committees are not rigidly controlled, which compounds confusion in the Libyan system. Although this adds organizational flexibility, in our judgment the committees have organizational weaknesses that prevent them from capitalizing on their flexibility. [] intermediate levels in the revolutionary committee structure—the municipality and city district committees—have little control over subordinate committees. More often than not, the RCB will contact neighborhood-level committees directly—and vice versa—bypassing the chain of command. []

[] Members of revolutionary committees below the RCB level rarely take the initiative without authorization from higher levels, nor do they suggest policy to the RCB, [] In our judgment, the result is a microcosm of the Libyan regime—a highly centralized system vulnerable to paralysis in the absence of the senior leaders. []

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
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Figure 5
Revolutionary Committees Organization



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- Individual Libyans wishing to obtain a job, keep a job, travel overseas, or study at a university must obtain the approval of their local revolutionary committee, [redacted]
- The revolutionary committees have the power to arrest, [redacted] torture is a common committee interrogation method, and political trials and executions have been conducted by "revolutionary courts" from time to time. [redacted]

Such power lends itself to abuse, and the revolutionary committees are widely feared and despised.

[redacted] The committees frequently seize private property and sometimes a neighbor's denunciation is enough to have one arrested by the committees. In addition, committee members exploit their position to obtain special privileges—such as acquiring a luxury automobile—or to benefit from graft, [redacted]

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Figure 6. A revolutionary committee member. Qadhafi calls on the revolutionary committees to perform security functions. [redacted]

[redacted] the "youth and ignorance" of the revolutionary committee members [redacted] especially irritate Libyan citizens. [redacted] Qadhafi has recruited the committees from the most disfranchised members of Libyan society—the young, the poor, and women. [redacted]

In our view, the elevation of what an official Moroccan service calls the "lowest strata of society" to a position of power tends to ensure the loyalty of the committees to Qadhafi. [redacted] a "typical" committee member is under 30, with a high school or junior high education, and unemployed. If this characterization is accurate, these loyalists would be unfamiliar with both Libya before Qadhafi and

conditions existing outside Libya. If Qadhafi left the scene, we believe they would follow the lead of senior RCB members. [redacted]

There are indications that Qadhafi has belatedly recognized the degree to which the revolutionary committees have generated hatred of his regime among the Libyan people. In March 1988, Qadhafi announced a series of reforms, ostensibly to curb political repression in Libya. These included release of some political prisoners, abolishment of the extrajudicial revolutionary courts, and announced plans to subordinate the security services to the people's committees. [redacted] the revolutionary committees have been ordered by Qadhafi to take a lower public profile and, in fact, have become less intrusive in the daily life of most Libyans. [redacted] the reforms have been well received by the Libyan population. [redacted]

Qadhafi apparently is setting up local revolutionary committees to be scapegoats for the abuses of his regime, but it is not clear how far he intends to reform his system. [redacted]

[redacted] Qadhafi has instructed the revolutionary committees to lie low for a few months for their own protection—there has been at least one incident of a mob killing local revolutionary committee officials in the wake of Qadhafi's announcement of reforms, [redacted]

Qadhafi's assault on the authority of the revolutionary committees may represent another of his frequent efforts to balance competing interest groups against each other. If so, the reduction of revolutionary committee power could lead to greater influence for the security battalions or regular military. This is far from certain at this point, however, as most of Qadhafi's reforms have fallen on local revolutionary committees. In our judgment, the committees will not be seriously diminished in power until senior revolutionary committee members such as Majdhub and Kilani have lost influence and authority and revolutionary committee activities in the military have been restricted. [redacted]

The Armed Forces. We believe that the Libyan Armed Forces, the institution Qadhafi used to seize power in 1969, has been the principal loser in the progressive radicalization of the regime. Once a privileged elite considered the "vanguard of the masses," the officer corps' political influence within the regime has declined steadily. Today the military establishment finds it difficult to defend its professional interests and corporate integrity, let alone help shape national policies. Nonetheless, the Armed Forces, by virtue of size, organization, and access to weapons, remains a force to reckon with in Libya, as attested by Qadhafi's extensive security measures aimed at the military. [redacted]

The clearest evidence of the decline of the political influence of the Army is its isolation from Qadhafi.

[redacted] Libyan military officers find that direct channels of communication to Qadhafi are increasingly blocked by the revolutionary committee members in Qadhafi's entourage. Consequently, [redacted] even senior officers believe they are cut off from decisions affecting their commands and must accept these decisions even when they disagree with them. Examples of the lack of the officers' influence include Libyan support to Iran and the war with Chad, [redacted]

A qualified exception to the political emasculation of the Armed Forces may be the so-called Free Officers' Union. The Free Officers, numbering about 80, were the original military conspirators recruited by Qadhafi in the 1960s to overthrow the monarchy. Many still serve in the Army, and Qadhafi apparently sees them as a personal constituency in the Armed Forces that he must at least consult on matters affecting the military. [redacted]

Qadhafi has in recent years convened the Free Officers after various crises, almost certainly in a bid to shore up his support in the military:

- In August 1984, after an assassination attempt against him by Libyan exiles in May and a subsequent brutal security crackdown, Qadhafi had several meetings with the Free Officers. He was said to be determined to retain the loyalty of the Army.



Figure 7. Abu Bakr Yunis Jabir, Commander in Chief of the Libyan Armed Forces and an original member of the Revolutionary Command Council. [redacted]

- In January 1986, Qadhafi told the Free Officers that there was no "second in command" in Libya and that, should he die, the country's leadership would be assumed by the people. This speech occurred after a possible coup attempt by Qadhafi's powerful cousin, Hassan Ashqal, in November 1985.
- Qadhafi again met with the Free Officers in July 1986, following the US airstrikes in March and April.
- The rout of Libyan forces in Chad apparently prompted meetings between Qadhafi and the Free Officers in the summer of 1987. [redacted]

Despite these meetings it is difficult to point to significant changes in Libyan policy as a result of the Free Officers' influence. In August 1986, Qadhafi demoted two senior Free Officers—Armed Forces Commander in Chief Abu Bakr Yunis Jabir and Army Inspector General Mustafa Kharubi—and canceled promotions for the entire officer corps. In our judgment, the Free Officers probably have little policy influence over Qadhafi, but he can blunt the growth of active opposition through selective dispensation of his patronage. In his 1987 meetings with the Free Officers, Qadhafi reiterated that he ultimately plans to abolish the regular Army, but he assured the Free Officers they would all be given positions of leadership in a popular militia, [redacted]

Attitudes and Organization of the Libyan Armed Forces

We believe that the Libyan officer corps, like that of many Arab armies, almost certainly gives its traditional national defense function a broad interpretation, defining its role as one of broad guardianship of the nation's values and well-being, as well as its defense against foreign enemies. Qadhafi's effort to limit the military's political influence has as a consequence struck at a central source of the officer corps' self-esteem. []

The long decline of the military's political influence with the Qadhafi regime has paralleled the Armed Forces' general discontent. []

[] as of September 1987 most senior and middle-level officers at Libyan military headquarters believed it would be best for Libya if Qadhafi were replaced. Specific grievances among military officers, [] include:

- Political issues, such as the absolute dominance of the regime and its security organs, the false nature of regime propaganda and other official deceit, the defeat in Chad, Libyan support for Iran, corruption of senior officials, and the abuses of the revolutionary committees.
- Economic issues, such as the decline in living standards, shortages of consumer goods, cuts in military housing allowances, and low and delayed salaries.
- Professional issues, primarily the interference of the revolutionary committees in the military chain of command, resulting in junior officers and enlisted personnel in the committees refusing orders from more senior officers. Related grievances include the impressment of raw reservists and students into military units in Chad, Qadhafi's clear lack of trust in the military, and his frequent public humiliation of them. []

Qadhafi has responded to the military's grievances largely by taking additional measures to neutralize the officers' ability to challenge the regime. The organization of the Libyan Armed Forces is in part a result of Qadhafi's fears of a coup and in part a reflection of his peculiar political style and theories. []

The Libyan Armed Forces—composed of the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Air Defense Command—number just under 100,000 people. Of these, the Army is the largest and most important, with about 60,000 troops. In addition, the military is probably the most representative institution in Libya, drawing personnel from all regions of Libya and all social strata. We believe this broad national composition is a strength, which may allow the military to pose as a truly national, unifying force in a post-Qadhafi Libya.^a []

Qadhafi's disregard for formal bureaucratic structures and chain of command, combined with his informal ties to groups such as the Free Officers, has proliferated confused lines of authority in the Armed Forces. Qadhafi remains Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. Beneath him is the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, Free Officer and former RCC member Col. Abu Bakr Yunis Jabir—essentially the Defense Minister. Yunis is assisted in his control of the Armed Forces by the General Staff Command, headed by Col. 'Abd al-Rahman al-Said. []

[] the General Staff Command serves as a liaison office between Yunis and the four service chiefs. In addition, [] most of the military directorates and administrative offices—those for Supply and Procurement, for example—are attached to the General Staff Command. Certain independent combat units such as the commandos and frogmen also answer directly to the General Staff. Security units, such as the Jamahiriya Guards, the Deterrent Forces, the Al-Sa'di Formation, and Military Intelligence, are assigned on paper to the General Staff Command but in fact answer only to Qadhafi. []

^a It should be remembered that, in the armed services, as in all Libyan institutions, tribal ties and personal patronage networks are important sources of loyalty and influence. []

The General Staff Command, via the service chiefs, commands the field forces of the services deployed throughout Libya. The ability of the Armed Forces, or of individual military commanders, to swing their units against the regime is severely restricted. Operational limitations include:


- Access to ammunition is not controlled by individual unit commanders or even by General Staff Command. The revolutionary committees, Military Intelligence, and the security battalions all have a say in its distribution and keep strict accounting of it.
- Command and control is confused, with General Staff Command headquartered at Al Jufrah; a

second "operations room" operating in the Tripoli area; and Qadhafi occasionally giving direct orders. It is not unusual for Qadhafi or the General Staff to bypass intervening echelons and issue orders directly to individual battalions—sometimes in conflict with those of intermediate field commanders.

- The battalions that make up a brigade typically are dispersed to several different garrisons, and the colocation of battalions from different brigades further complicates command and control.
- Unit commanders are frequently rotated to deny them a personal following in a given unit or location.

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Figure 8
Libyan Armed Forces Organization



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Figure 9. People's Militia on parade. Qadhafi hopes to replace the regular Army with such units.

The Libyan officer corps—including the Free Officers—have little leverage with Qadhafi to alleviate their grievances. Whereas Qadhafi must take into account the interests of the security battalions, which protect his regime, and the revolutionary committees, which advance his ideas, his pervasive and overlapping security apparatus reduces his need for support from the regular Armed Forces. As a result he usually can afford to ignore its interests. The Army is reduced to lobbying Qadhafi for a change in policy, conspiring to oust him from power, or defecting—all of which have been tried, with little success. Despite two serious military defeats—the US airstrikes in 1986 and the Chadian victories over Libyan arms in 1987—Qadhafi is unlikely to seek a significantly more capable and professional Army, for to do so would jeopardize his own survival.

Qadhafi's death or removal from power by other means is likely to generate efforts by the Armed Forces to regain its former position of political dominance. We believe that most officers would prefer a return to the more conventional nationalist policies that characterized Libya before 1975. US officials noted at that time that many of the officers were closely allied with the Libyan commercial classes and were hit hard by Qadhafi's socialist policies. The officers would probably welcome a return to a more market-oriented system. It remains very much an

open question whether the armed services can overcome their operational limitations to direct their considerable political mass against the rival security services and revolutionary committees.

Military Intelligence. Military Intelligence is Libya's senior intelligence organization, with a broad mandate to enforce both military and civilian loyalty.

there is a Military Intelligence presence at the General Staff Command, in all military units—presumably down to battalion level—in many towns and civilian establishments, and at border crossing posts. Unlike the revolutionary committees, however, Military Intelligence is dominated by Free Officers rather than civilian radicals. Its chief is Maj. Khuwaylidi al-Humaydi, a Free Officer, former RCC member, and former Interior Minister, who is one of the most prominent Libyan officials in internal security. Military Intelligence may prove to be a useful instrument for the Free Officers and military officers generally to regain influence in a post-Qadhafi Libya.

The primary mission of Military Intelligence is to suppress threats to the Qadhafi regime.

In pursuit of this mission, Military Intelligence wields considerable authority, particularly in the Armed Forces.

Military Intelligence representatives on military bases are especially powerful.

their powers include:

- Monitoring and recording the activities of military personnel and civilian officials of all ranks.
- The power to veto the departure of a military officer from a military area or the visit of an officer to a military area different from his own.
- Final authority over all guard personnel, military police units, and revolutionary committee members on base.
- Authority to overrule the base commanding officer.

The power of Military Intelligence is enhanced by the authority of its chief. Major Humaydi has access to Qadhafi and answers only to him.

Military Intelligence is a highly centralized organization, with

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
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Humaydi making all but the most routine decisions.

Moreover, [redacted]

[redacted] following the US airstrikes in April 1986, Humaydi was given expanded oversight over all organizations with internal security functions, except the revolutionary committees. [redacted]

A key indicator of Qadhafi's confidence in Humaydi on internal security matters is Humaydi's role as the only internal check against coup plotting in the Jamahiriya Guards battalions of Khalifa Hunaysh—the regime's last line of defense against a coup.




Despite this extensive authority—second only to the revolutionary committees'—Military Intelligence apparently does not generate the same contempt and

resentment from the military and public as the revolutionary committees. [redacted]

[redacted] Military Intelligence officers as dangerous men to cross. They endanger officers they do not like by filing critical reports about them, or, conversely, they protect their friends from security problems.

Such corruption, in our judgment, is not extreme by Libyan standards. Moreover, [redacted]

[redacted] Military Intelligence does not directly make arrests. Instead it relies on the military or civil police to apprehend suspects, and it rarely conducts executions. This "low profile" probably reflects Humaydi's moderate outlook. [redacted]



[redacted] given the generally professional, pragmatic views of Humaydi and the involvement of other Free Officers in the organization, we believe most Military Intelligence officers would favor a less radical program in a post-Qadhafi Libya. [redacted]

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[] although loyal, Humaydi disagrees with the radical course of Qadhafi's policies. In several instances he has lobbied the Libyan leader for a more moderate direction. We believe that, as an organization, Military Intelligence would support downgrading the status and power of the revolutionary committees and a return to greater professionalism in the Armed Forces. []

The Security Battalions. These are several praetorian guard units that are the most important pillars of Qadhafi's regime. The units have largely replaced the regular Armed Forces as the military guarantors of the regime. Composed of three main elements—the

Jamahiriya Guards, the Deterrent Forces, and the Al-Sa'di Formation—the security battalions are Qadhafi's last line of defense against internal enemies. They are the best equipped and presumably the best trained military units in Libya, although they generally lack the field combat experience of the regular Army units that have served in Chad. They are commanded by men with close ties to Qadhafi and have few institutional checks against their power. []

We estimate that the security battalions together total about 16,000 to 23,000 troops out of a 90,000-man Libyan military. Of these, the Deterrent Forces are

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Organization of the Security Battalions

The exact relationship of the Jamahiriya Guards, Al-Sa'di Formation, and Deterrent Forces to each other is unclear. Officially, all three units are subordinate to General Staff Command. [redacted]

[redacted] In practice, however, all three units answer only to Qadhafi. We believe the Jamahiriya Guards and the Al-Sa'di Formation are autonomous. The Deterrent Forces probably are considered autonomous, but [redacted] de facto Jamahiriya Guards Commander Hunaysh has more authority than the Deterrent Forces commander. We believe Hunaysh's authority is largely informal, reflecting his closer ties to Qadhafi. [redacted]

The Jamahiriya Guards—headquartered in Tripoli and organized into battalions—are primarily based in Tripoli and Benghazi, where they guard Qadhafi's headquarters compound at Aziziyah Barracks, ordnance depots, the Umm 'Aitiqah and Benina air bases, and the Tajura' nuclear research facility. The Al-Sa'di Formation, on the other hand, is concentrated mainly in Qadhafi's tribal homeland of Sirtica, although some units have operated in Chad. The Deterrent Forces are more widely dispersed than the Jamahiriya Guards and Al-Sa'di Formation. They are concentrated in several garrisons throughout the region of Tripolitania. [redacted]

[redacted] Deterrent Forces units almost certainly are located in Benghazi and Tobruk. Some were deployed to Chad in 1987. [redacted]

[redacted] Hunaysh is the de facto commander of the Jamahiriya Guards. [redacted]

[redacted]

The Al-Sa'di Formation, headquartered at Surt, consists of at least 12 battalions and has been commanded by Qadhafi's cousin Sayyid Qadhaf al-Dam since about November 1985. [redacted] Although a unit of designated "Al-Sa'di" has been in existence in the Surt area since at least 1981, it underwent an expansion in 1986 when General Staff Command was relocated to Al Jufrah in Sirtica. It was expanded again in June 1987, after the Libyan retreat from Chad. [redacted]

The Deterrent Forces, [redacted] are headquartered in Tripoli. The Deterrent Forces' concentration in Tripolitania and their control of ballistic missiles and self-propelled artillery units suggest they have a role in defending against external attack. [redacted] they also guard important facilities such as radio and television stations and man the outer defense of Qadhafi's compound (inner layers of defense are Jamahiriya Guards). [redacted]

The security battalions are the most potent military units in Libya. Their ability to respond quickly to a threat with considerable firepower is unmatched. Among their advantages over the others:

- They are the best equipped of Libyan units, and [redacted] they receive new equipment before the other Libyan units.
- The security battalions control their own weapons storage and ammunition. [redacted]

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- They are subject to few of the checks and balances of the regular Army, resulting in comparatively simple and efficient command and control.

The main organizational weakness of the security battalions is that they are not under one unified command other than Qadhafi himself. In Qadhafi's absence, this could create confusion and perhaps internecine conflict.

The competition between Hunaysh and Sayyid Qadhaf al-Dam also could become dangerous following Qadhafi's exit.

Qadhafi's practice of placing officers in a nominally superior position to Hunaysh is another potential weakness of the Jamahiriya Guards. In Qadhafi's absence, a strong officer might use his official position as commanding officer to challenge Hunaysh's control over the Jamahiriya Guards.

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
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Figure 12
Security Battalions Organization



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


Figure 14. Sayyid Qadhaf al-Dam, commander of the Al Sa'di Formation. [redacted]



Figure 15. Heavy artillery of the Deterrent Forces on parade. [redacted]

the largest, with a complement of 12,000 to 15,000 troops. The Jamahiriya Guards and the newer Al-Sa'di Formation are of roughly equal size, between 2,000 and 4,000 troops each. The authority of these units is not as broad as that of the other institutions examined, but they control some key geographic positions in Libya. [redacted]

Qadhafi's security battalions are independent and heavily armed units that are prepared to crush military or civil insurrections. They do not have extensive authority over other institutions in Libya, but they control their own arsenals. The security battalions are a more effective military force than either the regular Armed Forces or the revolutionary committees and are much better positioned to assume control of the country in Qadhafi's absence. [redacted]

The leaders of the security battalions are especially close to Qadhafi. [redacted] de facto Jamahiriya Guards commander Khalifa Hunaysh has close personal and tribal ties to Qadhafi. Sayyid Qadhaf al-Dam, who heads the Al-Sa'di Formation, is a cousin of Qadhafi. Because of their close ties to Qadhafi and the vital nature of their commands, we believe that Hunaysh and Qadhaf al-Dam are among the most powerful men in Libya. The commander of the Deterrent Forces, Misbah al-'Arusi Wanis, is less prominent than either Hunaysh or Qadhaf al-Dam, [redacted]

We judge that Hunaysh has more authority and influence with Qadhafi than Qadhaf al-Dam. [redacted]

Hunaysh's organizational base is probably stronger than Qadhaf al-Dam's. The Jamahiriya Guards, which was formed in 1969, almost certainly is the best organized of the security battalions. In addition, Hunaysh [redacted] control Qadhafi's personal bodyguards, as well as a separate plainclothes security patrol that monitors public gatherings. The Al-Sa'di Formation has been in existence since the mid-1970s, but it assumed significant security functions and expanded to its present size only in the past 12 to 18 months—in part, we believe, because of a decision by Qadhafi to build a counterweight to the Jamahiriya Guards. [redacted]

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Institutional Profile: Security Battalions

The following is an example of the four institutional profiles developed for the exercise on page 23. [redacted]

Internal Political Dynamics

- *Source of political power.*
 - Close personal ties between senior leaders and Qadhafi.
 - Tribal network of loyalties and patronage.
 - Least restricted access to weapons.
 - Tight chain of command; strong degree of cohesiveness.
- *Political goals.*
 - Maintain the regime in power.
 - Maintain own perks and privileges.
 - Maintain tribal dominance.
- *Loyalty structure.*
 - Qadhafi.
 - Individual unit commanders.
 - Tribal.
 - Individual unit.
- *Preferred political tools.*
 - Patronage—close personal relationship of senior leaders with Qadhafi and tribal network.
 - Qadhafi's institutional need.
 - Control of physical security, including facilities important to the regime.
- *Decisionmaking process.*
 - Tight military hierarchy.
- *Internal leadership path.*
 - Patronage of senior commanders.

- *Government bureaucracy leadership path.*

- Continued high degree of loyalty.

- Tribal ties.

- Use of institutional position. [redacted]

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25X1**Relationship With Revolutionary Committees**

- *Bureaucratic.*
 - No close formal ties.
 - Some functional overlap.
- *Unofficial.*
 - RC leadership tends to come from the same tribes.
 - Security battalions willing to tolerate the RCs as long as there is no interference in professional or corporate affairs.
 - Some worry by senior security battalion leaders that revolutionary excesses of the RCs may threaten tribal dominance. [redacted]

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Current Assessment. The security battalions are uninterested in the ideological agenda of the RCs. Personal and tribal ties, however, result in a mutual tolerance centered on Qadhafi's institutional need for each [redacted]

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Relationship With Military

- *Bureaucratic.*
 - Security battalions have some oversight authority over the military.
 - Security forces have been used on rare occasions to disarm the military.

[redacted] the security battalions [redacted] we believe [redacted] are largely apolitical, or at least not heavily committed to Qadhafi's ideology. The three security battalion units are recruited from Qadhafa, Warfalla, and allied tribes considered loyal to the regime, [redacted] Jama-hiriya Guards personnel have never been known to

discuss politics or to express antiregime sentiment. Presumably they would wish to perpetuate their elite status and would be willing to support their commanding officers to secure power after Qadhafi's exit.

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- *Unofficial.*

- *Military shows resentment over the perks, weapons, and training given the security forces.*
- *Shared policy pragmatism and tribal ties* [redacted]

Current Assessment. Qadhafi uses the security battalions to intimidate the military. However, the unwillingness of the security battalions to interfere with the military's professionalism or legitimate role allows for a passive coexistence [redacted]

Relationship With Tribes

- *Bureaucratic.*
 - *Nonexistent.*
- *Unofficial.*
 - *Strong informal patronage network.*
 - *Most of the security battalions recruited from loyal tribes.*
 - *Existence of strong tribal loyalties* [redacted]

Current Assessment. Tribal loyalties remain a key force in both the cohesion of the security battalions and their ties to Qadhafi. [redacted]

Minimum set of factors and relationships needed to maintain political power:

- *Relatively unrestricted access to weapons.*
- *Internal cohesion, within and between units.*
- *Professional military competence* [redacted]

Minimum set of factors and relationships needed to increase political power:

- *Eliminate the RCs as political rivals.*
 - *Formalize control over the military* [redacted]
-

We believe Hunaysh would be likely to support a more pragmatic set of policies than those now favored by Qadhafi, [redacted]

[redacted] Hunaysh was one of several regime officials criticized in the press by the revolutionary committees in 1983. More recently, [redacted]

[redacted] Hunaysh in 1987 was "exasperated" with the revolutionary committees.

Given reports of Hunaysh's following in the Army and his cultivation of tribal support, we believe that Hunaysh in power would support traditional interest groups at the expense of the radicals. [redacted]

Sayyid Qadhaf al-Dam, on the other hand, frequently has written ideological articles for revolutionary committee publications, which suggests that he is more supportive of Qadhafi's philosophy. [redacted]

[redacted] Like Hunaysh, Qadhaf al-Dam was criticized for "antirevolutionary" behavior in 1984. At that time, [redacted] his villa was ransacked, almost certainly by revolutionary committee members. He probably would jettison the *Green Book* if, as is likely, it became a political liability after Qadhafi leaves the scene. [redacted]

A State of Imbalance?

The system Qadhafi has adopted is highly segmented to prevent the coalescence of interest groups capable of challenging the regime. Each of the four institutions examined serves as a check against the others. Three of them are internally divided as well—the revolutionary committees by tribal factions and a lack of lateral contacts, the security battalions by organization into three distinct and autonomous units, and the Armed Forces by their dispersed and confused deployment. [redacted]

We believe this system is reasonably stable as long as the balancer—Qadhafi—can adjust the equilibrium of the system without permanently alienating its key components. However, Qadhafi may have upset the domestic political balance beyond repair. Distrust of the military officer corps has led the Libyan leader to hobble the Armed Forces with the security organs and effectively neutralize their ability to compete for political influence. In so doing, Qadhafi has given himself wide latitude to push revolutionary policies with little active resistance from the Army. By freezing out the military establishment from the circle of power, Qadhafi, however, has reduced its stake in his regime and its policies. [redacted]

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We doubt that Qadhafi's recent efforts to downgrade the power and status of the revolutionary committees will result in greater influence for the military officers. It seems unlikely that after some 10 years of holding the Army in check that Qadhafi is prepared to trust them. As of mid-May 1988, Qadhafi alone appears to be the main beneficiary of the curbing of the revolutionary committees. [REDACTED]

Qadhafi's neutralization of the officer corps has made him more dependent on his security apparatus. This narrower power base may make it more difficult for Qadhafi to reconcile the divergent interests of his radical supporters and the pragmatists, who are increasingly concerned with the repercussions of economic mismanagement, military disaster, and international obloquy. So far Qadhafi has dealt with this dilemma by co-opting individual officers, by fostering tension within the security battalions— [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]—and by relying on tribal solidarity among key Qadhafa and Warfalla officers. [REDACTED]

However, Qadhafi cannot take tribal loyalty for granted, in our judgment. The Qadhafa tribe was [REDACTED] concerned that Qadhafi's radical policies would harm Libya and put the tribe in danger of retribution should he die.

[REDACTED] Continued disasters such as the rout in Chad or the US airstrikes could convince those men close to Qadhafi that their interests are better served by removing the "Brother Leader," than risking being swept aside with him. It is possible that pressure from those officers with tribal ties to Qadhafi precipitated the Libyan leader's sudden announcement of political and economic reforms in March 1988. [REDACTED]

Outlook

After more than 18 years in power, Qadhafi's revolution is a study in irony. Some Libya watchers argue that, except for the names of the leaders, Qadhafi has changed little in the way Libya is governed. Like King

Idris before him, Qadhafi stands unelected and pre-eminent over the Libyan political system, mediating factional disputes. Under the monarchy, the Libyan Royal Army was balanced by the elite Cyrenaican Defense Force recruited from the loyal tribes of Cyrenaica. Under Qadhafi, the Army is checked by the security battalions drawn from the Qadhafa and Warfalla tribes of Sirtica. King Idris drew his moral legitimacy from his position as Imam of the Sanusiya religious order, whose members gathered in "lodges" across Libya; Qadhafi bases his legitimacy on his role as "Leader of the Revolution," the adherents of which form revolutionary committees with offices around Libya sometimes called "lodges." Idris and Qadhafi also share an aversion to Tripoli, the King retreating frequently to Al Bayda' or Darnah, Qadhafi to Surt or Sabha, and both discussed moving the capital from Tripoli to towns in their own tribal homelands. [REDACTED]

If Qadhafi has not greatly changed the form of rule in Libya, he has thoroughly transformed the regime's foreign policy orientation. Under the monarchy Libya was essentially pro-Western, accommodating US and British military bases, and was passive toward, if not disengaged from, inter-Arab disputes and the Arab-Israeli conflict. Under Qadhafi, Tripoli has pretensions to leading worldwide resistance to US and Western interests, continues to urge the destruction of Israel, actively supports terrorism, and allows a sizable Soviet Bloc presence—albeit no bases—in Libya. Qadhafi is a confirmed, if ineffective, activist, especially in the cause of Pan-Arabism—a cause eschewed by Idris. [REDACTED]

Qadhafi has overturned much of the old domestic structure. There is a new elite, drawn from different tribes and classes than those of the monarchy. Academic sources point out that the original RCC was composed of mostly rural, lower-middle-class officers. [REDACTED] the minority Qadhafa tribe, whose members hold many key positions in the military and government, achieved political prominence only as a consequence of Qadhafi's rise to power. Similarly, the Free Officer coup of 1969 established the principle of military rule in Libya, a principle we believe likely to survive Qadhafi. Moreover, in the 1970s Qadhafi funneled a greater proportion of oil earnings to the people than did the

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King, which helped to create a larger middle class. Ironically, Qadhafi's subsequent persecution of the Libyan commercial classes has been an important factor in eroding his political support. [REDACTED]

In our judgment, all these groups will remain important political interest groups under a successor regime, but their role will vary depending on the circumstances of Qadhafi's removal. A new regime almost certainly will not dominate the system as well as Qadhafi has, because:

- No coup leader will come to power with as much prestige as Qadhafi. He will have to earn that through both a firm defense of his position and successful policies. He also will have to find a new formula for legitimacy, different from Qadhafi's *Green Book* revolutionism.
- A coup leader almost certainly will have to broaden his support by addressing the manifold grievances of institutions such as the Army, as well as those of the general public.
- Removing pro-Qadhafi support from lower levels of government is a process that probably will take time. [REDACTED]

In our judgment, these factors are likely to cause a successor to Qadhafi to move gradually but steadily away from Qadhafi's radicalism and to become less confrontational abroad as the new regime seeks to consolidate its rule at home. Even if Qadhafi is not ousted in a coup but is assassinated or dies of natural causes, these conditions are likely to shape the policies of a successor government. [REDACTED]

Qadhafi's removal is certain to usher in a period of competition between individuals and institutions seeking greater influence if not control over the system. The duration and intensity of this competition will depend on the ability of individual leaders, and their bases of support, to move quickly, decisively, and with unity of purpose. [REDACTED]

Likely Winner. We believe the security battalions are the institutions most likely to dominate the system in Qadhafi's absence. They have the advantage in weapons and access to ammunition, their hold on key

Life After Qadhafi: An Exercise

An analysis of six scenarios based on the probable behavior of key Libyan players—the military, revolutionary committees, security forces, and [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] to the security battalions. In this scenario, the revolutionary committees that have carried out Qadhafi's radicalism will be downgraded or eliminated. Although this assessment of a future Libya emerged from the exercise as most probable, other possibilities—involving more violence, civil unrest, and political chaos—were rated as being within the range of possibility. [REDACTED]

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The primary objective of the exercise (explained in more detail in the appendix) was for Libyan experts to construct and then assess the probable occurrence of independent scenarios and to explore their assumptions and biases. Profiles of each of the players were developed in order to probe the knowledge of Libyan experts, to allow for meaningful comparisons of behavior strengths and weaknesses, and to provide data for the scenarios. [REDACTED]

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The exercise indicated that the unity of Libya's security forces is the key determinant of the shape of a post-Qadhafi government. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] the exercise suggests that the delicate balance Qadhafi maintains among key players—particularly the military and revolutionary committees—would quickly and dangerously unravel in the absence of a strong power broker or successor, whether from the security forces or the other major elements. Rivalries among tribal, regional, and bureaucratic groups as well as security force commanders increase the likelihood of unrest, while factionalism and paralyzing competition could cause spiraling violence and the collapse of central authority. Under these conditions, two scenarios—political chaos and the rise of a radical clique—might come to pass. [REDACTED]

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
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Figure 16
 Alternative Scenario Cluster



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geographic positions around the country, and their shared tribal and regional background. Moreover, they have much to lose if another group seizes power. In such a case the security battalions almost certainly would be disbanded or subordinated to the Army to eliminate the danger of their staging a counter coup.

A key unknown is whether security battalion unit commanders can subordinate their personal ambitions to the larger interests of tribe or country.

Hunaysh and Sayyid Qadhaf al-Dam (along with his brother Ahmad) are ambitious individuals who are competing to position themselves as successors to Qadhafi. Although we believe it more likely that these two powerful officers will come to an agreement on sharing power, we cannot rule out the possibility that their personal ambitions will outweigh their tribal ties and lead to open conflict between them.

A related question is the degree to which Hunaysh and Qadhaf al-Dam command the political loyalty of their respective units. It is possible, but we believe it unlikely, that in Qadhafi's absence some of the rank

and file in the Jamahiriya Guards and Al-Sa'di Formation would "fold up their tents" and seek anonymity once their raison d'être disappeared. This eventuality or the eruption of conflict between Hunaysh and Qadhaf al-Dam would weaken the ability of the security battalions to retain power and would create opportunities for the Army or revolutionary committees to challenge their position.

Assuming that the leaders of the security battalions recognized their mutual interest in cooperation and maintained the loyalty of their troops, we believe the most likely succession scenario would be a reasonably smooth transition of power from Qadhafi to a collegial rule dominated by the security battalions. Although there will be competition for power and jockeying for political position in this transition, we do not expect it to lead to open conflict—eventually a leader will emerge, probably one of the commanders of the security battalions. Such a regime probably would be ruthless toward its domestic opponents. It also probably would abandon Qadhafi's revolutionary agenda—although not necessarily his rhetoric—in favor of more pragmatic policies. It probably would continue a hardline policy toward Israel, including support for radical Palestinians.

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Other Scenarios. If the security battalions fail to maintain their cohesion, other scenarios are possible. Even then, we judge the most likely outcome of a Libyan succession to be a pragmatic regime dominated by a coalition of factions from the security battalions, the Armed Forces, and Military Intelligence. Even a collapse into political chaos is possible, if less likely, should all the institutions in Libya fragment and no one leader or organization be capable of dominating the country (see appendix). []

Likely Loser. Just as the strengths of the security battalions argue in favor of those units dominating Libya after Qadhafi, the weaknesses of the revolutionary committees point to the decline of this most radical of Qadhafi's institutions. We judge the inability of the revolutionary committees to maintain effectively their position without Qadhafi to be a major factor that will push Libya toward a more pragmatic policy. []

Most important, the revolutionary committees will have lost their main source of legitimacy and power with Qadhafi gone. []

[] believes that the revolutionary committees are so hated that they will be swept away in the absence of Qadhafi. []

[] in the immediate aftermath of the US airstrikes in 1986, local revolutionary committees burned their records, fearing that if Qadhafi was dead, or about to fall, they would face retribution from the public. With their ability to intimidate diminished because of Qadhafi's ouster, we believe the revolutionary committees would lose much of their authority. The rank and file probably would look for other patrons to protect them, and the committees' victims could be emboldened to settle accounts with their tormentors. Moreover, the revolutionary committees would make popular and convenient scapegoats for a successor wishing to place blame for Qadhafi's excesses elsewhere. []

In addition, the confused command and control of the revolutionary committees, their lack of lateral contacts, and their tribal and personal factions in our view hinder the committees' ability to operate in a cohesive way. Moreover, the RCB controls much less firepower than its rivals. The small arms available to

the revolutionary committees could not stand up to the heavy armored units of the security battalions. This in itself would limit the committees' ability to dominate the regime. Finally, the lack of initiative by rank-and-file committee members and centralized decisionmaking in the RCB, in our judgment, makes the revolutionary committees vulnerable to paralysis if senior RCB officials are incapacitated. []

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It is possible that senior RCB officials, such as Muhammad Majdhub and Ali Kilani, will exploit their tribal ties to maintain a position in a post-Qadhafi government. We are more skeptical, however, of their ability to keep the revolutionary committees together once Qadhafi is gone. If they cannot, these senior RCB officials will most likely have to preserve their position by supporting a successor from a different institution—such as the Jamahiriya Guards—rather than using the committees as a vehicle to power for themselves. []

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For similar reasons, we doubt that 'Abd al-Salam Jallud—the prominent but nominal chief of the RCB often considered Qadhafi's number-one deputy—could successfully contend to succeed Qadhafi. He lacks complete control over his main organized power base—the revolutionary committees—which is the weakest of the key institutions likely to be involved in a succession struggle. Jallud, a member of the Maqarha tribe, is further handicapped by his lack of tribal ties to the powerful security battalions. []

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Implications for the United States

Almost any successor regime, in our view, is likely to be less radical and pose fewer problems for the United States. A regime dominated by the security battalions, the Armed Forces, Military Intelligence, or a coalition of these probably will curtail worldwide support for revolutionary causes and turn its attention to Libya's pressing economic and social problems. In our judgment, only a regime dominated by the revolutionary committees—the least likely outcome—would try to continue Qadhafi's policies of confrontation with the United States and the West. []

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A successor regime is most likely to build popular support by bringing order to Qadhafi's chaotic system

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of government, curtailing foreign adventures, and redressing popular grievances. Because it probably will focus on economic priorities, the new government will have to improve its international image to facilitate access to Western consumer goods, credit, technology, and managerial expertise. Expanded commercial relations with companies in Western Europe could persuade governments there to help reduce Libya's arms dependence on Moscow by supplying advanced weaponry. A successor regime might not sustain the current high level of arms purchases—a drastic cutback on military purchases is quite possible. []

Any new Libyan regime, other than one dominated by the revolutionary committees, would probably try to move away from Libya's confrontation with the United States toward a more constructive relationship with Washington. It most likely would try to:

- Disassociate itself from Qadhafi's tarnished international reputation.
- Attract the participation of the US private sector in Libya's oil industry and in economic development projects and gain US and Western assistance in reforming the badly mismanaged economy.
- Avoid situations likely to provoke US hostility.

The new regime, however, probably would proceed cautiously in its contacts with Washington to preserve its nationalist credentials. It certainly would seek to demonstrate independence from all foreign, especially US, influence. A successor government, for example, would continue to support the Palestinian armed struggle and to oppose many US policies in the region such as US-sponsored Middle East peace initiatives. Any Libyan government almost certainly would remain involved in neighboring areas where traditional Libyan interests are engaged, such as Tunisia, Niger, Sudan, and Chad, although it probably would reduce the aggressive content of Libyan relations with these countries. A post-Qadhafi Libya probably would maintain Qadhafi's claim to the Aozou Strip but would be less interested in meddling in Chadian internal affairs. []

Worst Case. If a radical regime emerges from the ashes of Qadhafi's government against more likely odds, revolutionary committee extremists probably would threaten US interests as much as Qadhafi has. Although initially distracted from foreign adventures by the need to consolidate their position, the radicals almost certainly would continue to support terrorism and subversion as foreign policy instruments. The revolutionary committees currently oppose Soviet ideology, but their weak position at home, or a perceived threat from the United States, could cause them to align Libya more closely with Moscow or grant the Soviets greater access to Libyan military facilities. []

In some ways, a radical successor regime might pose more problems for the United States than has Qadhafi. Almost any revolutionary committee official who might emerge to run the government after Qadhafi would have much less prestige and personal power and less control over the country. As a result, the successor might not restrain the most radical elements from mounting terrorist operations unilaterally, which could lead, at least for a while, to even more reckless Libyan policies. []

Moscow's Prospects. Although Libyan radicals might turn to the Soviets in desperation, we believe Moscow on its own could not install a Marxist-oriented, pro-Soviet regime. Soviet advisers are too few and scattered to take control of the Libyan military and swing it into action. Moreover, there is widespread dissatisfaction in the Libyan military with the quality of Soviet equipment and assistance and a general cultural alienation and ill will resulting from the Soviets' condescension toward their Libyan counterparts. Soviet capability to influence a Libyan succession would depend on which groups come to the fore. They may have influence with nationalist military officers and Qadhafi and Warfalla tribesmen who have been trained in the USSR or have worked closely with Soviet Bloc personnel. []

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Conversely, Qadhafi's removal is not likely to lead to a sudden reversal of Soviet fortunes in Libya. A successor regime would be unlikely to end its military dependence on Moscow in the near term. Although the installation of a pro-Soviet Marxist regime in Libya is unlikely, we believe Moscow would retain considerable influence in Libya in a post-Qadhafi period.

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Summing Up. Qadhafi's revolution has largely run its course, and he must rely on coercion to perpetuate his revolutionary vision. Just as Libya in 1969 was ripe for a change to a more nationalistic and activist regime, we believe it is ripe for a return to normality. A likely successor regime's pragmatism may resemble that of Algeria or, if the radicals retain influence with a successor, perhaps that of Syria. Libya almost certainly will not return to the openly pro-Western orientation of the monarchy

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Appendix

Six Scenarios for Succession

Analysts devised scenarios covering six possible outcomes to competition for political power, ranging from a smooth governmental transition to political chaos. An expert opinion model examined the analytical assumptions. It asked analysts to consider the following:

- The minimum conditions—internal to the actor organizations and actor interactions—that had to exist for an actor to behave in the manner prescribed by the scenario. Institutional profiles developed by the analysts provided the data used to make these judgments.
- The likelihood of these conditions occurring in post-Qadhafi Libya. Analysts individually assigned subjective probabilities to each set of conditions, using this scale as a guide:

100	
90	Will happen
80	
70	Likely to happen
60	
50	Might happen
40	Could happen, but not likely
30	
20	
10	
0	Will not happen

Analysts scores were averaged to assign a composite value to expected behavior. The four scores—one each for the military, revolutionary committees, security forces, and Military Intelligence—were averaged to determine the subjective probability of the overall scenario. Scores at both levels—conditions and scenarios—occasionally showed a wide spread. 25X1

Each scenario was treated as an independent case. The object was to determine the likelihood of a set of key factors needed for a scenario to happen and, in turn, the probability of that scenario. The six final scores overlap as a result. 25X1

Table A-1**Scenario 1: Overall Probability—67 percent**

Qadhafi is ousted. The security battalions (SB) use their positions in key locations, notably Tripoli, to take immediate control of the country. Senior members of the tribes, revolutionary committees (RC), and the military are initially consulted. Within a year, a governing coalition is established. The RCs, stripped of most security functions, remain primarily a means

of political mobilization. The security battalions remain the dominant force, the head of state being an individual agreed upon by the three security units. The transition to coalition government progresses smoothly. [] sporadic violence between the military and former RC members, as individuals settle accounts. (S NF)

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Underlying Factors

Actor	Behavior	Minimum Internal Conditions Needed To Fulfill Scenario	Minimum Actor Interaction Needed To Fulfill Scenario
Security Battalions	Form coalition government	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Commitment to continued Qadhafi-Warfalla cooperation outweighs personal ambitions of individual unit commanders. • Maintain least restricted access to weapons. • Agreement on pragmatic policy agenda. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ability to provide perks to individual unit commanders. • Secure cooperation of Military Intelligence (MI). • Neutralize power of RCs.
Revolutionary Committees	Factional rivalries overpower unifying forces	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fragmentation along tribal and factional lines. • Tribal interests of leaders outweigh institutional one. • Loss of power and prestige by senior leaders. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SB view that RCs not needed as an institutional ally. • Army allowed to subordinate RCs to military command. • Fight other institutions over patronage privileges.
Military Intelligence	Join coalition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maintain institutional loyalties. • Maintain operational links to other security organs. • Lack of revolutionary agenda. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SB view that MI needed to maintain general calm and restrain RCs. • SB invites MI head to join coalition government or replaces him with own man. • Institutional patronage more important than tribal network.
Armed Forces	Support coalition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inability of senior command and Free Officers to operate as cohesive bloc. • Inability of senior command to overcome operational difficulties; perception that military unable to mount own coup. • National loyalties dominate institutional loyalties. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Substantial upgrade in perks and authority given by SB. • Visible reduction in RC power. • Strong personal links among SB, MI, and military leaders.

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Table A-2**Scenario 2: Overall Probability—58 percent**

The security battalions take immediate control after Qadhafi. When cohesion deteriorates over personal rivalries and competing patronage networks, unit leaders begin seeking allies. Libya enters a period of growing unrest. [] escalating violence between the military and the RCs as well as violent confrontations between units. The second year without Qadhafi begins with the Jamahiriya Guards and Deterrent Forces banding together. Military Intelligence, anticipating that the two units will take

power, becomes a third power. A purge of RC and military members tied to the Al-Sa'di Formation precedes its disbanding. The coalition consolidates power by reorganizing the RC and military institutions. The year ends with a government dominated by a single individual from the Jamahiriya Guards. The RCs remain as a political institution with civil security functions, although their members in the Armed Forces are subordinated to the military chain of command. []

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Underlying Factors

Actor	Behavior	Minimum Internal Conditions Needed To Fulfill Scenario	Minimum Actor Interaction Needed To Fulfill Scenario
Security Battalions	Jamahiriya Guards take power	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Personal ambitions of unit leaders create intense power rivalries. Strong unit loyalties combine with personal loyalty to unit leaders. Jamahiriya Guards leadership demonstrates greater ability than others to distribute favors. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Rivalries erupt between patronage networks. Jamahiriya Guards able to deliver perks to individual military commanders. Willingness of Jamahiriya Guards leadership to work with RCs.
Revolutionary Committees	Rank and file rallies behind limited leadership	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Tribal interests of RC leadership take precedence over institutional rivalries. Willingness of RC leadership to bend revolutionary agenda and limit political tools. Rank-and-file RC members respond to natural leadership vacuum by rallying to RC leadership. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Strong access to Guards leaders. Successful lobbying to limit Army. Guards see that RC needed for mobilization and information services.
Military Intelligence	Support Jamahiriya Guards	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Maintain centralized leadership. Strong personal prestige of MI head. Maintain operational links to other security organs. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Strong personal relations between MI and Guards leaders. Ability to exert influence over the Army. Failure of tribal patronage networks to dominate.
Armed Forces	Support Jamahiriya Guards	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Maintain rank-and-file support and access to weapons. Inability to overcome operational problems. Free Officers unable to coalesce as a bloc. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Upgrade in perks and authority by Guards. Visible reduction in RC power. Pragmatic policy agenda shared with Jamahiriya Guards and MI leadership.

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Table A-3

Scenario 3: Overall Probability—56 percent

The security battalions initially take power after Qadhafi, but they cannot maintain the internal cohesion necessary for holding power. Personal rivalries and dwindling tribal support weaken the security battalions and civil order begins to break down—one year after Qadhafi. The head of Military Intelligence mobilizes the Army to intervene. In the coup that follows, security battalion leaders are arrested and their units disbanded or subordinated to the military's chain of command. Military Intelligence leadership woos senior members of the revolutionary committees, particularly Jallud, and succeeds in gaining the

cooperation of Jallud's faction, which has been out of favor in the RC. The Army engages in a violent purge of committee members at all levels, directed by MI and the new RC leadership. Show trials and public hangings are used to gain the support of the general population and limit the influence of the RCs. By the second year, a military-dominated coalition rules Libya. Revolutionary committees exist as a political party, functioning as a lobby for revolutionary domestic policies and as a source of mobilization. They have no powers of enforcement.

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Underlying Factors

Actor	Behavior	Minimum Internal Conditions Needed To Fulfill Scenario	Minimum Actor Interaction Needed To Fulfill Scenario
Security Battalions	Violent internal conflict	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Intense personal rivalries escalate to violent confrontation. • Inability of faction leaders to dominate agenda patronage networks. • Eroding loyalty structure; tribal solidarity fragments, many SB troops desert. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inability to co-opt support of key military commanders. • Fluctuating policy—pragmatism versus revolutionary ideology. • Inability to co-opt the RC.
Revolutionary Committees	Failure to unify behind any one leader	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • RC leadership fragmented along the same lines as the security battalions. • Continued decisionmaking inertia at all levels. • Continued strong focus on ideology and revolutionary agenda. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Willingness of military leaders to compromise in order to co-opt the RC. • Personal loyalties between MI leaders/new RC leadership. • Inability of Qadhafi RC leaders to exploit ties to SB to dominate the RC.
Military Intelligence	Mobilization of Army for coup	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strong focus on pragmatic, nationalist agenda. • Personal prestige of MI leadership remains intact. • Strong institutional and national loyalties. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Continued violence between SB factions. • Continued military operational problems prohibiting own coup. • Ability of MI leadership to get backing of Free Officers.
Armed Forces	Coup	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Shared view by leadership that military identity subject to further erosion by violence. • Free Officers coalesce as a single bloc. • Shared view among military that Armed Forces have the right to take over the government since the SB have brought the country chaos. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Limited access to SB leaders. • Strong personal links between MI and military leadership. • Perception that the RC may make strong political gains if violence continues.

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Table A-4

Scenario 4: Overall Probability—55 percent

The security battalions take immediate control after Qadhafi. However, personal rivalries, differing policy agendas, and abuse of patronage networks loosen the existing cohesion. Within a year, the three units begin competing for power. The search for allies, particularly from within the RC and military commands, deepens tribal rivalries and patronage misuse. Violence begins to spiral out of control. Within a year,

the Jamahiriya Guards and Deterrent Forces join in a military coalition, but the Al-Sa'di Formation counters this strength with links to the military. Libya enters a period of intense destabilization as neither side can firmly secure power. The country degenerates into political chaos, and, by the second year, the chances of foreign intervention increase.

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Underlying Factors

Actor	Behavior	Minimum Internal Conditions Needed To Fulfill Scenario	Minimum Actor Interaction Needed To Fulfill Scenario
Security Battalions	Violent rivalry between Jamahiriya Guards and Al-Sa'di Formation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Bitter personal rivalries between unit leaders. Deterrent Forces leadership allies with Guards leaders based on personal relationships. Equal ability of Guards and Al-Sa'di to command patronage networks. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Violent competition by patronage networks. Al-Sa'di leadership mobilizes key military leaders. Willingness of SB factions to work with the RC.
Revolutionary Committees	Split in RCs between SB factions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Violent tribal rivalries. Fragmentation on ideology and revolutionary agenda. Rank-and-file members fail to rally to their leaders. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Strong personal ties to both SB factions. Ability to successfully lobby SB factions to limit retribution. Recognition by both factions that RCs needed for mobilization and security functions.
Military Intelligence	Remain neutral in power struggle	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Maintain centralized leadership. Strong personal prestige of MI head. Maintain operational links to other security organs. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Recognition by SB factions that MI services will not affect outcome. Ability to work with RC leaders. Willingness to limit oversight authority over the Army.
Armed Forces	Slight factional split	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Maintain manpower and access to weapons. Inability of senior leaders to overcome operational limitations without support from SB. Factional loyalty dominates loyalty to the nation or institution. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Willingness of a strong military faction to ally with Al-Sa'di Formation. Perception that RC retains too much political power. Tribal patronage network dominates.

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Table A-5

Scenario 5: Overall Probability—53 percent

Security battalion units split into two factions over personal rivalries and abusive patronage networks. The Jamahiriya Guards, together with the Deterrent Forces, oppose the Al-Sa'di Formation. Competition for allies becomes bitter and violent. The Al-Sa'di Formation secures strong military allies and outmaneuvers the Guards in gaining the support of the Army and MI. After a period of time, the Jamahiriya

Guards is disarmed and disbanded following a coup led by the Al-Sa'di Formation. The military joins the Al-Sa'di government as a junior partner. The revolutionary committees are purged of members from losing factions and stripped of security functions in military and civil affairs. They continue to function as an interest group and propaganda arm.

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Underlying Factors

Actor	Behavior	Minimum Internal Conditions Needed To Fulfill Scenario	Minimum Actor Interaction Needed To Fulfill Scenario
Security Battalions	Al-Sa'di Formation captures political power	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Violent personal rivalries between unit leaders. Strong loyalty to unit commanders. Al-Sa'di leaders can dominate key patronage networks, tribal support. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Al-Sa'di leadership able to deliver more perks to individual military commanders. Al-Sa'di willingness to curtail RC authority. Al-Sa'di willingness to work with MI.
Revolutionary Committees	Factional rivalries dominate unifying forces	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Tribal and factional rivalries in SB split RC leadership. Unwillingness to bend revolutionary agenda. Rank-and-file RC members, noting leadership vacuum, distance themselves from RC activities. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No strong personal ties between Al-Sa'di and RC leaders. Change in tribal hierarchy. MI operations broadened in civilian security.
Military Intelligence	Supports Al-Sa'di Formation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Maintains centralized leadership. Strong personal prestige of MI head. Maintains operational links to other security units. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Al-Sa'di recognition that MI can be used for mobilization and information services. Ability to limit ties to RC. Willingness to work closely with new Army leadership.
Armed Forces	Supports leadership of Al-Sa'di Formation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ability of one faction to overcome operational limitations. Personal prestige of new faction. Willingness to bend pragmatic policy approach. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Good personal ties between MI and Al-Sa'di leaders. Significant reduction in RC power. Ability to successfully lobby for limited oversight by MI.

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Table A-6

Scenario 6: Overall Probability—50 percent

Libya enters a period of intense domestic violence following fierce outbreaks of tribal factionalism and bitter personal rivalries among security battalion unit leaders. Ruthless, key radicals in the revolutionary committees exploit the confusion to increase their power. An SB unit, owing political favors to these radicals for their support in the fighting, manages to

form a weak coalition government. The RC radicals become an important source of power and are increasingly able to push the government toward policies based on revolutionary ideology. The greater their influence, the more hardline the policies they favor. Chances for a radical coup, perhaps two years after Qadhafi, increase.

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Underlying Factors

Actor	Behavior	Minimum Internal Conditions Needed To Fulfill Scenario	Minimum Actor Interaction Needed To Fulfill Scenario
Security Battalions	Cohesion deteriorates	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bitter personal rivalries between unit leaders. • Inability of unit leaders to secure and effectively distribute perks. • Tribal solidarity fragments. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inability of individual SB factions to mobilize Army. • MI chooses to remain neutral in SB rivalries. • Recognition by SB factions that RC needed for security and mobilization functions.
Revolutionary Committees	Leaders forge a consensus for their agendas	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Radical leaders able to mobilize rank-and-file members. • Radical leaders dominate patronage networks. • Radical leaders maintain RC agreement on ideology and revolutionary agenda. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SB greatly weakened by continued infighting. • MI unwilling to challenge broadening security functions of RC. • Strong ability of RC leaders to convince factions that past record of RC less important than present strengths.
Military Intelligence	Remain neutral	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increasing independence and prestige of MI officers with ties to the RC. • Loss of prestige by MI head; leadership breaks down. • Maintain operations links to other security organs. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MI leaders unwilling to cooperate with Armed Forces to challenge RCs. • RCs co-opt MI officers. • Ability to limit ties to SB factions.
Armed Forces	Institutional inertia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inability of senior leaders to overcome operational limitations. • Splits between loyalty structures and preferred policy agendas. • Free Officers cannot coalesce as a bloc and recognize that Army cannot seize power. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inability of SB to increase or protect authority of military. • Pragmatic policy agenda increasingly unimportant to SB and MI as fighting continues. • RCs maintain control over military garrisons.

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